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THE EFFORT TO FEDERATE 
EAST AFRICA: A POST-MORTEM 
J. H. PROCTOR, JR. 
EAST Africa has been generally regarded as the section of that 
continent where a federal movement would be most likely to 
succeed. Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda displayed striking simi-
larities in political institutions and ideas as they emerged from 
British rule, and a substantial measure of inter-territorial economic 
integration had been achieved through the East African Common 
Services Organisation (EACSO), a common market and a common 
currency. With the transfer of power to African hands, the chief 
obstacle to earlier efforts at closer political association—the fear of 
extending the influence of Kenya's white settlers throughout the 
area—was eliminated. 
The Declaration of Intent to Federate 
It was not surprising, therefore, when the heads of the three 
Governments solemnly declared in Nairobi on June 5, 1963, their 
intention to create an East African Federation; and their pledge to 
attain that goal by the end of the year did not seem altogether un-
reasonable. A Working Party was being established to draft the 
federal constitution, they announced, and its proposals would be 
considered by a full-scale conference in the third week of August. 
Federation did not in fact materialise in 1963, and although there 
were strong indications during the following year that no real 
progress was being made in that direction, most East African 
politicians continued to talk—publicly, at least—as if agreement 
would be reached fairly soon. By June 1965, however, it was clear 
to all concerned that federation was no longer a live issue and that, 
indeed, the most that could be hoped for would be to hold together 
some of the existing arrangements for economic co-operation. 
It is not too early to attempt at least a preliminary inquiry into 
the causes of this failure. The full record of the federal negotiations 
has not yet been made available, but it is possible to define the key 
differences which arose in the Working Party on the basis of partial 
disclosures by some of its members, and the more basic underlying 
* The author has recently spent fifteen months teaching and doing research in East Africa. 
He is Associate Professor of Political Science in Duke University, North Carolina. 
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difficulties can be identified from an analysir of Government 
publications and local Press reports since the Nairobi Declaration. 
I 
The Working Party, which consisted mainly of Ministers from the 
three territories, held its first meeting in Dar es Salaam on June 
9 and 10, 1963. Negotiations apparently proceeded very smoothly. 
The Kenyan Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Mr. 
T. J. Mboya, reported that they had " fully examined all points 
relating to the constitution " and had " reached agreement on every 
issue " and none of the other members contradicted him. The 
legal advisers had been instructed, he added, to outline an initial 
draft for consideration by the group at its next session in Kampala 
on June 29, and the United Nations had been requested to supply 
specialists to assist on financial and public service matters. 
At Kampala, the Working Party not only discussed the lawyers' 
draft at length, but also met with the three Heads of Government 
and with several of Uganda's hereditary rulers. Mr. Mboya again 
gave the Press a highly optimistic account of what was accom-
plished. The talks had gone so well, he said, that the full federal 
conference might take place earlier than originally planned; the 
lawyers were preparing a revised constitutional draft which the 
Working Party would examine on July 15 in Nairobi.2 Actually, 
however, very serious differences emerged on this occasion. The 
Ugandan delegation, which had been given a new chairman after 
the first meeting, refused to accept the decisions which had been 
made at Dar es Salaam and no compromise could be found between 
the stand it now took on several fundamental questions and the 
views of Kenya and Tanganyika. 
Agreement proved impossible at the Nairobi session as well, so it 
was decided that each delegation should consult with its Govern-
ment and then prepare for circulation to the others a memorandum 
stating in detail its position on the unresolved issues. There was 
still no official indication that the negotiations had run into 
difficulty. In fact, Mr. Mboya assured the Kenyan House of 
Representatives on August 2 that matters were proceeding " very 
satisfactorily " and that the constitution would be produced " within 
the next ten days or so ".3 
The memoranda revealed no significant change in the position of 
1 Tanganyika Standard (Dar es Salaam), June 11, 1963. 
2 East African Standard (Nairobi), July 3, 1963. 
3 Kenya House of Representatives, Official Report, August 2, 1963, col. 1670. 
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any of the delegations and the Working Party found itself still 
deadlocked when it reconvened in Dar es Salaam on August 9. The 
group decided, therefore, to make a full report on the impasse to the 
heads of Government and to ask them for fresh directives. For 
public consumption, it was announced by Mr. Oscar Kambona, the 
Tanganyikan Foreign Minister, that they had " covered a very wide 
area of agreement in spite of a few issues on which there was a 
difference of opinion among delegations", and that a meeting of 
the heads of Government would be held within a few days at which 
he was " very hopeful " that the differences would be resolved.4 
Uganda soon informed the others, however, that it would not 
take part in a summit conference until the Working Party's report 
had been considered by each of the Governments; and Mr. A. A. 
Nekyon, the Minister of Planning and Community Development 
and the head of its delegation, stated that such consideration would 
take so long that it seemed to him " practically impossible to have 
Federation this year ".5 
The meeting of the three heads of Government was finally 
scheduled for September 19 at Nairobi; but at the last moment the 
Ugandan Prime Minister, Dr. Milton Obote, decided not to attend, 
allegedly because of illness, and it had to be postponed. Shortly 
thereafter, Mr. Joseph Murumbi, the Kenyan Minister of State with 
responsibility for external relations and a member of the Working 
Party, publicly expressed doubts about the possibility of including 
Uganda in the federation and indicated that Kenya and Tanganyika 
might have to unite alone initially.6 When Dr. Obote demanded to 
know whether Mr. Murumbi was expressing official Kenyan policy, 
the Prime Minister, Mr. Jomo Kenyatta, replied that he had voiced 
only his own personal views, and invited Dr. Obote to name a date 
for a meeting of the heads of Government. 
It was not until January 14, 1964, that the three top leaders 
actually came together. At that session, Dr. Julius Nyerere, the 
President of Tanganyika, expressed grave concern over the economic 
disadvantages which his country was suffering from the continued 
operation of the common market without federation. Dr. Obote 
reportedly " explained very frankly the political difficulties he was 
facing on the issue of Federation . . . [and] suggested that the next 
step should be to concentrate on the economic aspects of closer 
4 Tanganyika Standard, August 12, 1963. 
6 Uganda Argus (Kampala), August 21, 1963. 
0 East African Standard, October 25, 1963. 
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association 'Y They and Mr. Kenyatta could agree merely to 
instruct their Ministers or Directors in charge of economic planning 
to examine jointly " certain problems connected with economic 
development which need to be sorted out urgently for the 
harmonious development of the three states ".8 
When those officials met two months later, Tanganyika put 
forward such drastic proposals for redressing the imbalance in its 
trade with Kenya and Uganda that the other two simply reported 
back to their Governments and a further summit meeting was 
promptly arranged. It was widely rumoured that Tanganyika was 
threatening to establish a separate currency and to withdraw from 
the common market unless federation could be quickly achieved. 
Each of the heads of Government was accompanied by a strong 
ministerial team when they met in Nairobi on April 10 and 11. 
Dr. Nyerere pressed for immediate federation, but secured only an 
agreement that the Working Party should make a further attempt 
to resolve the outstanding differences and that an Emergency 
Committee should be set up to examine Tanganyika's economic 
proposals. That committee subsequently recommended a quota 
system for interterritorial trade and a scheme for allocating industries 
among the three states, which were accepted by the Governments. 
Backbench Impatience 
Meanwhile, there were signs of growing impatience among back-
benchers in Kenya. On April 9 the Parliamentary Group of the 
ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) passed a resolution 
expressing concern over the possibility of a breakdown in the federal 
negotiations and calling for an early meeting of Government back-
benchers in all three territories to accelerate federation. The 
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) Parliamentary Group 
heeded the call and sent nine representatives to Nairobi for a 
conference on May 7, but the Ugandans declined to participate. 
The conference called upon the three Heads of Government to 
sign before May 20 a declaration that their countries should federate 
" for thwi th" , that they would meet again within fifteen days to 
sign " the interim articles of Federation ", and that these articles 
should be ratified by the National Assemblies no later than June 16, 
1964.9 Should Uganda not agree to such a course of action, the 
7 United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar National Assembly, Official Report, June 
23, 1964, col. 348 (O. S. Kambona). 
* East African Standard, January 15, 1964. 
« Ibid. May 11, 1964. 
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backbenchers resolved, Kenya and the United Republic of Tanga-
nyika and Zanzibar should proceed to federate alone. 
Delegations were dispatched to present these resolutions 
personally to each of the three Heads of Government. The one 
which called upon President Nyerere was warmly received; he told 
them: " I state quite categorically that the Government of the 
United Republic and myself are fully committed to entering imme-
diately into a Federation with Kenya and Uganda, or with Kenya, 
or Uganda, alone ".10 Dr. Obote, on the other hand, informed the 
delegation to Kampala that he did not agree with the resolutions 
and would not attend the proposed meetings. He said that they 
were trying to force federation before many important issues had 
been settled, and that Uganda would not be pushed.11 Mr. Kenyatta 
told the conference delegation that he wanted all three territories to 
federate, not just two. In a television statement, he denied that 
there had been undue delay in the formation of a federation and 
asserted that the heads of Government " have been working for 
federation in a brotherly atmosphere that none had rejected it, 
and that all were " keen to go ahead ". He termed the resolutions 
" ill-timed " and the suggestion that Kenya and the United Republic 
might federate alone " most unfortunate ".12 
A further—and final—session of the Working Party took place in 
Kampala from May 30 to 31. On this occasion, concessions were 
made by Kenya and the United Republic to the Ugandan demands 
on some points, and Mr. Nekyon told the Press that " great 
improvements had been made . . . and there were now far fewer 
outstanding p r o b l e m s H e anticipated that another summit 
conference would be held to settle the matters which remained in 
controversy after the three Governments had examined the Working 
Party's report. These rather optimistic comments prompted the 
United Republic to publish that report immediately, lest the public 
be completely misled. " The differences which have emerged in 
the Working Party's discussions . . . are so fundamental ", it stated, 
" that the East African people should be taken into confidence 
immediately by providing them with an accurate report." 14 This 
1 0 " The President's Reply to the Delegation from the Nairobi Meeting of Representatives of 
the KANU and TANU Parliamentary Groups, 10.5.64 " , Meetings and Discussions on 
the Proposed East Africa Federation (Dar es Salaam: Information Services of the United 
Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, September 1964), p. 20. 
11 Uganda Argus, May 11, 1964. 
12 East African Standard, May 12, 1964. 
13 Uganda Argus, June 1, 1964. 
1 4 "Governmen t Statement on the East Africa Federation, June 1, 1964 " , Meetings and 
Discussions of the Proposed East African Federation, p. 6. 
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report revealed, in fact, that the Ugandan Minister of Internal 
Affairs, Mr. F. K. Onama, had stated the view or his delegation to 
be that federation was not feasible and that attention should be 
shifted to strengthening EACSO. 
In an effort to revive negotiations, the Kenyan House of Repre-
sentatives passed on June 18 by a vote of 59-28 over the Govern-
ment's objections a resolution requesting that Instruments of 
Federation be ratified by August 15, 1964; and four days later the 
Parliament of the United Republic unanimously approved a motion 
calling for immediate federation with either or both of the other two 
territories. 
Uganda was unmoved, however. On June 26, the National 
Assembly there considered an Opposition resolution urging the 
Government to clarify its position on federation, and the Ministers 
who participated in the debate were clearly unwilling to proceed 
with the project for the present. As Dr. Obote departed from 
Entebbe for a meeting of the EACSO Authority in Nairobi on that 
same day, he emphasised to the Press that he was not going there to 
discuss federation and asserted that the Kenyan and United Republic 
resolutions would have no effect whatever on the decisions to be 
made by Uganda.15 
Two days before the deadline set by the Kenyan House, Mr. 
Kenyatta issued a statement to the effect that he had been unable to 
consult with the other two leaders on federation because of the 
recent London and Cairo conferences, but that his Government 
would study the Working Party's report " with a view to continuing 
discussions with the other East African Governments ". He offered 
his assurances that " everything will be done to expedite the 
establishment or formation of an East African Federation ".16 
Friction and Dissent Among the Governments 
There was no evidence of any advance towards that goal in the 
following months, however. Indications were, instead, that the 
three territories were moving further apart. The May 1965 session 
of the EACSO Central Legislative Assembly (CLA) was suspended 
indefinitely after acrimonious exchanges between its members which 
were sparked by Kenya's seizure of a Ugandan arms shipment being 
transported without authorisation across its territory from Dar es 
Salaam. More ominously, the next month Tanzania announced that 
15 Uganda Argus, June 27, 1964. 
1 6 " Statement by the Kenya Government on the East African Federation ", Sessional 
Paper No. 5 of 1964/65, August 13, 1964. 
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it was withdrawing from the currency union. This action was most 
probably prompted by Dr. Nyerere's conclusion that federation was 
no longer a practical possibility. It might conceivably have been 
designed to shock the others into reopening negotiations on the 
federal constitution, but it certainly did not have that effect. Mr. 
Onama told the Ugandan Assembly that unless Kenya and Tan-
zania accepted the conditions which he and Mr. Nekyon had laid 
down at the last Working Party meeting, " they will keep crying 
until the heavens fall There was widespread apprehension that 
the actual effect would be to bring on the disintegration of the 
common market and the common services. 
II 
The failure to achieve an East African Federation may be attributed 
in the first instance to the inability of the three Governments to 
agree on the provisions of a federal constitution, and some insight 
into the problem can be gained from an analysis of the disputes 
which divided the Working Party. 
Differences Over the Constitution 
One issue which could not be settled was the site of the federal 
capital. At its first meeting, the Working Party agreed on Moshi, 
Tanganyika; but when Mr. Nekyon appeared as the new head of 
the Uganda delegation at its second session, he insisted that unless 
his territory gained the capital there would be no federation. Such 
a demand arose from Uganda's fear of being " the backwater of the 
proposed federation " 18; the capital was required to offset the weak-
ness arising from its landlocked location. At the final meeting of 
the Working Party, this question was moved to the bottom of the 
agenda and, after it proved impossible to reach agreement on other 
matters, the chairman decided that there was no point in discussing 
it further. Kenya and Tanzania might well have given in to 
Uganda on this matter had negotiations continued, but such a 
concession would not by itself have secured its acceptance of 
federation. 
A second major stumbling block was the organisation of the 
federal parliament. Agreement was reached at an early stage that 
it should consist of two chambers—a House of Representatives with 
1 7 Uganda National Assembly Debates, June 22, 1965, Tape No. 24, p. 4. 
1 8 Uganda National Assembly, Official Report, June 26, 1964, col. 1934 (A. A. Nekyon). 
For a general discussion of the capital issue, see Aaron Segal, " Choosing a Federation 
Capital " , East Africa Journal, Vol. I (May 1964), pp. 2-7. 
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seats distributed among the three territories in proportion to popu-
lation and filled by direct elections, and a Senate in which each 
territory would have an equal number of members chosen by its 
own legislature. Such a structure was designed to provide some 
protection for Uganda which had a population of approximately 
seven million as compared with Kenya's eight and a half million 
and Tanganyika's nine and a half million. There were sharp 
differences, however, over the powers of the Senate at the second 
meeting of the Working Party. Uganda demanded that these must 
be at least as great as those of the House of Representatives and 
preferably greater. A strong Senate was needed, Mr. Nekyon 
argued, to balance the strong one-man executive, which Uganda had 
reluctantly accepted after its proposal of a collegial executive had 
been rejected, and to prevent Uganda from being overwhelmed in 
the legislative process by the more populous territories. The second 
chamber must, he insisted, consent to political appointments, 
approve treaties, and agree to all Bills before they became law.19 
Kenya and Tanganyika maintained, on the other hand, that under 
such an arrangement " the states would overshadow the Federal 
Government, inhibiting the vigorous exercise of Federal powers, and 
upsetting the proper balance of the Constitution ".20 Neither side 
was prepared to compromise on this issue and it remained unsettled 
to the end. 
Even more critical was the dissension which emerged over the 
division of powers between the central and unit governments. At 
the first session of the Working Party, agreement was reached " in 
broad outline ", and the lawyers were told that a strong federation 
was desired.21 At the second meeting, however, Uganda came out 
forcefully in favour of a very weak central government, holding 
that the following subjects must remain under territorial control: 
mines, higher education, agriculture and marketing boards, live-
stock and animal husbandry, trade unions, external borrowing, 
citizenship and foreign affairs. Kenya and Tanganyika held 
initially that power over each of these matters must be ceded to the 
centre, but sufficient concessions were made on both sides to permit 
substantial agreement finally on all but the last two items. Kenya 
and Tanganyika maintained consistently that federation by defini-
tion required the centralisation of control over citizenship and 
foreign affairs. " Without these powers ", said the latter, " there 
1 9 Uganda National Assembly, Official Report, June 26, 1964, cols. 1940-41. 
2 0 United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar National Assembly, Official Report, June 
23, 1964, col. 346 (O. S. Kambona). 
21 Ibid. col. 345 (O. S. Kambona). 
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can be no question of a genuine political association." 22 Uganda 
denied this and charged the others with being mistaken in assum-
ing that there was some standard federal model which must be 
followed in all cases.23 
The Ugandan position was that citizenship of each territory 
should automatically confer East African citizenship, but that East 
African citizenship should not make one a citizen of the other 
territories. Mr. Nekyon explained that Uganda insisted on retaining 
control over citizenship because it wished to be able to restrict the 
interterritorial movement of persons. Uganda was afraid that its 
efforts to provide full employment and higher standards of living 
would be frustrated by a massive influx of Kenyans.24 Kenya with 
its problems of unemployment and land hunger, had a strong 
interest in guaranteeing freedom of movement; but Mr. Mboya 
indicated that his Government would, by way of compromise, 
consider arrangements by which the labour market of each terri-
tory might be protected " to some extent ".25 That offer was 
not accepted by Uganda, however, and the question remained 
deadlocked. 
Uganda was also adamant on keeping power over external rela-
tions. It was not prepared to lose its identity as a sovereign member 
of the international community and was particularly anxious to 
retain its separate representation in the United Nations. Mr. 
Nekyon argued that Uganda was prevented by its adherence to the 
Charter of the Organisation of African Unity from merging into a 
larger unit, for the preamble of that document asserted that signa-
tories were " determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won 
independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
our states". Uganda was committed to the eventual federation of 
the African continent, he continued; if it surrendered foreign affairs 
to an East African Government now, what could it relinquish 
ultimately to that wider federation? He argued, moreover, that 
East Africa's strongest weapon in international affairs was its three 
separate voices and votes in the United Nations. Lacking any 
2 2 "Governmen t Statement on the East African Federation, June 1, 1964" , loc. cit. 
2 3 Uganda National Assembly, Official Report, June 26, 1964, cols. 1933, 1939-1940 (A. A. 
Nekyon). 
24 Ibid. col. 1938 (A. A. Nekyon). 
2 5 " Summary of the Meeting of the Working Party on East African Federation Held in 
Parliament House, Kampala, on Saturday 30th May, 1964 ", Meetings and Discussions 
on the Proposed East Africa Federation, p. 10. See also T . J. Mboya, " E a s t African 
Labour Policy and Federation " , Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems, 
ed. C. Leys and P. Robson (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 104. 
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significant military power, " we require ", he said, " more voices to 
shout and be heard on the international scene ".26 
Kenya and Tanganyika rejected these arguments altogether, 
holding that " unless the Federal Government was given exclusive 
control over foreign affairs we could not be said to have established 
a Federation at all ".27 Kenya was willing to go no further than to 
offer to explore ways of ensuring that the territories would have 
some share in the shaping of foreign policy—such as giving the 
Senate power to approve diplomatic appointments and according a 
prominent role to a Foreign Relations Committee of that body—but 
this overture evoked no response. 
It is possible that Uganda was sincerely trying to find a formula 
for federation which would safeguard its interests adequately, feeling 
that the danger of its being outvoted by the other two territories 
was so great that the competence of the Federal Government must 
be held to the barest minimum. Many Kenyans and Tanganyikans 
were convinced, however, that its position on the division of powers 
really amounted to saying that it was not prepared to accept 
federation at all. Rather than reject the principle openly and 
directly, it may well have adopted the tactic of making demands 
which it knew to be unreasonable and unacceptable. 
While the differences over the content of the constitution were 
obviously quite acute, an interpretation of the failure to federate 
East Africa simply in terms of these drafting difficulties would be 
naive and inadequate. For one thing, the Working Party did not 
actually discuss the full range of problems involved in framing a 
federal constitution. It never got around to considering the financial 
aspects of political union, for example. This would in all probability 
have been a particularly troublesome matter to sort out, for Uganda 
was very much afraid that it would be required to pay a dispro-
portionately large share of the costs of the Federal Government and 
possibly even to subsidise the other two territories. Its anxieties on 
this point were communicated by Dr. Obote to the other Heads of 
Government in a letter of September 29, 1963.28 But a more 
important reason for looking beyond the deliberations of the 
Working Party is the fact that these constitutional disputes were 
merely superficial reflections of more basic underlying pressures and 
conflicts. 
2 6 Uganda National Assembly, Official Report, June 26, 1964, col. 1937. See also cols. 
1935-1936. 
2 7 United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar National Assembly, Official Report, June 
23, 1964, col. 347 (O. S. Kambona). 
2 8 Uganda National Assembly, Official Report, July 3, 1964, col. 2188 (S. N. Odaka). 
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Ill 
The difficulties seem to have been due in part to foreign inter-
ference. Dr. Nyerere warned a TANU conference in August 1963 
that " outside people" were trying to undermine the federal 
effort29; and the Kenyan Finance Minister, Mr. J. S. Gichuru, told 
the CLA that " it was these outside influences which got in our 
way ", when explaining why the deadline set in the Nairobi Declara-
tion had not been met. " If we had been left alone, I am quite sure 
we would have done much more up to this moment", he added.30 
Both of them declined to identify the sources of those external 
pressures, however. 
Several Tanzanian M.P.s asserted that it was the colonialists and 
neo-colonialists who were responsible, and the TANU newspaper, 
The Nationalist, on June 23, 1964, accused the United States and 
the United Kingdom in particular of intervening to prevent federa-
tion because East African unity would hasten the liquidation of 
white rule in Mozambique and Rhodesia. No tangible evidence was 
ever offered in support of these allegations, however. 
Ghana's Opposition 
A real source of external interference was Ghana. Dr. Nkrumah 
was openly opposed to regional federations in general, for he felt 
that they would impede the achievement of the continental unity 
which he favoured. " There is the danger ", he wrote, " of the 
development of regional loyalties, fighting against each other." 31 
He was said to have charged covertly that East African Federation 
was a neo-colonialist plot designed to perpetuate Western exploita-
tion of the area and to instal stooges of the West in more powerful 
positions.32 Some of those who differed from Dr. Nkrumah 
suggested that his opposition really stemmed from the fear that an 
East African Federation would be too formidable a rival to Ghana 
for the leadership of all of Africa. In any event, the federal effort 
was bitterly condemned by the Government-controlled newspapers 
of Accra, and Ghanaian officials in East Africa engaged in " a n 
unrestrained public diplomatic offensive " 3 3 as well as clandestine 
29 Daily Nation (Nairobi), August 20, 1963. 
3 0 East African Common Services Organisation, Proceedings of the Central Legislative 
Assembly Debates, January 16, 1964, col. 1428. 
3 1 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (London: Heinemann, 1963), p. 214. 
3 2 Richard Cox, Pan-Africanism in Practice : An East African Study, PAFMECSA 1958-
1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 76. 
3 3 Thomas M. Franck, East African Unity through Law (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1964), p. 161. 
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" lobbying"34 against the project. Dr. Nkrumah himself sent 
messages directly to various East African leaders registering his 
disapproval of federation and urging them not to proceed with it. 
The Ghanaian campaign was most active and most effective in 
Uganda. Several M.P.s there echoed Dr. Nkrumah's views when 
developing the case against federation in the National Assembly. 
Mr. S. N. Odaka, the Deputy Foreign Minister, said that he had 
been told by the representative of a powerful nation in Kampala that 
his Government would make available to Uganda ten times more 
aid than had previously been discussed if it would enter the federa-
tion. " I hope ", he said, " that we will not willingly see neo-
colonialism of this nature dangled at us. . . . I will tell them that 
Uganda is perfectly ready and prepared to continue being poor but 
we will not sell ourselves to any country."35 The Minister of 
Housing and Labour, Mr. G. B. K. Magezi, reported that he had 
been impressed by evidence in the External Relations files that the 
Western embassies " have been more interested in our immediate 
federation than even ourselves ".3e A variety of ulterior motives 
behind such interest was suggested in the parliamentary debates— 
that federation would provide a large market for Western capitalists, 
would be a base from which neo-colonialist agents could operate, 
would create an economic entity too small to support industries 
which might compete with British and American firms, and would 
frustrate a wider and more powerful union. Dr. Nkrumah was 
cited explicitly in support of the argument that East African 
Federation must be rejected because it might delay the creation of a 
full-scale Pan-African Government. 
While Ghana's attitude and activity probably contributed some-
what to the reluctance of the Ugandan Government to proceed with 
federation, it was not a major factor. The effect of external 
pressures generally was exaggerated by some East African leaders to 
save them from having to acknowledge the importance of other 
causes nearer home. Mr. John Kakonge, Uganda's Director of 
Planning and a member of the Working Party, put the matter in 
perspective when he said in June 1965, " The problems were clearly 
internal, and it would be a reflection on the sincerity of our leaders 
. . . if they sought to absolve themselves from the failure to bring 
about unity by laying the blame on outside forces 
3 4 Cox, op. cit., p. 75. 
3 6 Uganda National Assembly, Official Report, July 3, 1964, col. 2190. 
36 Ibid. July 10, 1964, col. 2410. 
37 Uganda Argus, June 17, 1965. 
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IV 
A basic internal problem was the growth of a separate nationalism 
in each of the three territories and an increasing tendency for them 
to give priority to local interests, rather than to the general East 
African interest, in their relations with each other. 
Separatist Trends 
This trend had actually appeared before the Nairobi Declaration, as 
evidenced particularly by the breakup of the East African Navy in 
1962 and by Uganda's withdrawal from the East African Tourist 
Travel Association in February 1963. It seemed to become stronger 
in the months which followed. Ugandans complained more 
frequently that they were not getting a fair share of the benefits 
provided by EACSO, referring especially to the location of most of 
its offices and training schools in the Nairobi area and to the small 
number of Ugandans among those recruited and promoted by that 
Organisation. Friction also developed within the University of East 
Africa; the agreement to prevent duplication of professional faculties 
among the three constituent units broke down and Uganda resented 
decisions which seemed to hold its Makerere College back to allow 
the newer colleges to catch up with it. Stresses within the common 
market became more serious as manufacturing and commercial 
activity congregated increasingly around Nairobi and as Kenya's 
exports to Uganda and Tanganyika continued to be much greater 
than their exports to it; special arrangements were demanded to 
encourage industrialisation in the two less-developed territories and 
to redress the imbalance in their trade. The development of these 
conflicts and tensions led many Ugandans to be less enthusiastic 
about federation, for they felt that the selfish attitudes displayed by 
Kenya and Tanganyika and the dominating position of the former 
in these arrangements would only appear again—and more 
dangerously—within a federal union. 
Relations between the three territories were also strained by their 
rivalry for investment capital and markets as they proceeded to 
develop their economies separately. Uganda took umbrage at the 
way in which the Kenyan and Tanganyikan development plans 
were drawn up. One of its representatives in the CLA told that 
body in January 1964 that it was those two territories which were 
delaying federation because each of them had planned, without 
consulting its neighbours, for the establishment of industries which 
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already existed elsewhere in East Africa and had thereby opened the 
way to overproduction and wasteful competition.38 
The primary commitment to narrow territorial interests also 
found expression in the deliberations of the Working Party itself. 
Mr. Nekyon described the tone of its meetings as follows: 
We are negotiating now as independent states and when we sit at the 
conference table we talk as if we are talking at Geneva on disarmament. We 
are not talking on friendly terms as relations or as clans, but we are speaking 
as different states discussing their own future. . . . We appreciate we are 
brothers but we will do everything in our power to see that Uganda gets her 
due share irrespective of our relations.39 
The growth of such attitudes had been clearly foreseen by Dr. 
Nyerere in 1960 when he urged that federation should take place 
before the attainment of independence. It could hardly have been 
avoided once his proposal was rejected. The leaders of the newly 
independent states found it immediately necessary to strengthen the 
sense of national identity within each country if political stability 
was to be maintained, particularly in Kenya and Uganda where 
tribalism and separatism were acute problems. In mobilising loyalty 
around Kenyan or Ugandan leaders, institutions and symbols, how-
ever, they stimulated feelings which militated against federation. 
Moreover, the leaders themselves were impelled to behave national-
istically by the urgent demand for rapid economic development and 
social reform. Each one had to demonstrate in easily understandable 
terms his overriding concern for the problems and interests of his 
own electorate if he was to maintain popular support. 
Divergent Policies 
The prospects of federation were further reduced as the three 
territories developed somewhat divergent policies and as the diffi-
culties in reconciling these came to be appreciated. In general, 
there was a tendency for Tanzania to move further and faster to the 
Left on both foreign and domestic issues. 
In the realm of external affairs, all three professed to be non-
aligned, but in the months following the Nairobi Declaration 
Tanganyika seemed to be leaning much more towards the East than 
were the other two, especially after its union with Zanzibar. This 
caused considerable concern in Uganda and Kenya; Dr. J. G. Kiano, 
the Kenyan Minister for Commerce and Industry, said in August 
1964 that certain fundamental problems must be solved before 
3 8 EACSO, Proceedings of the CLA Debates, January 16, 1964, cols. 1422-1424 (S. Nyanzi). 
3 9 Uganda National Assembly, Official Report, July 12, 1963, col. 1046. 
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federation, and that in particular " people will also have to agree on 
the true meaning of political non-alignment ".40 The rift widened 
during the following year, however. 
Domestically, there were significant dissimilarities in policies 
regarding economic development as well as labour. Tanganyika 
seemed to many Kenyans and Ugandans to be proceeding along 
more extremely socialistic lines in the planning of its economy than 
were their territories. Mr. Ali Kisekka of Uganda told the CLA 
that this made federation difficult; " I do not know how we East 
African countries could co-ordinate our economic policies when we 
have this sort of difference ", he said.41 The subjection of Tanga-
nyika's trade union movement to strict Government control 
produced anxiety elsewhere in East Africa. Mr. Nekyon said that 
it was the unacceptability of Tanganyika's labour legislation and the 
fear that it might spread throughout the area in the event of federa-
tion which caused Uganda to insist that authority over trade unions 
must not be surrendered to the centre.42 Others regarded the 
Tanganyikan legislation as a bar to federation altogether. Mr. 
Humphries Luande, President of the Uganda Trade Union Con-
gress, served notice that he would oppose federation so long as that 
system of control continued,43 and a meeting of trade union leaders 
in Kenya resolved that Tanganyika must bring its laws into line 
with Kenya's Industrial Charter before federation would be 
acceptable.44 
Certain aspects of the Tanzanian political system also had a 
deterrent effect. Ugandan Ministers and backbenchers were critical 
particularly of the reorganisation of the Tanganyikan army on a 
political basis following the mutiny, the lack of elections in Zanzibar 
after the revolution, the existence of only one party, and the pre-
cariousness of civil liberties. Mr. Magezi alluded to the last of these 
when he told the Assembly that " the political ideology of Tanga-
nyika and Zanzibar has made things more difficult for the East 
African Federation to come about quickly ",45 
Personal Interests and Federation 
Many East Africans believe that a major share of the blame for the 
failure of the federal effort must be laid at the feet of certain leaders 
40 Mombasa Times, August 7, 1964. 
4 1 EACSO, Proceedings of the CLA Debates, May 22, 1964, cols. 219-220. 
4 2 Uganda National Assembly, Official Report, June 26, 1964, col. 1940. 
4 3 Roger D. Scott, " L a b o u r Legislation and the Federal I s sue" , East Africa Journal, 
Vol. I (November 1964), p. 26. 
44 East African Standard, August 12, 1963. 
4 5 Uganda National Assembly, Official Report, July 10, 1964, col. 2412. 
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who were afraid that their own status might be reduced if it 
s u c c e e d e d . They were said to prefer to remain " big fish in little 
ponds ".46 
Generally this charge was levelled not against the heads of 
Government but against their Ministers and other " junior leaders " 
who realised, it was said, that their high posts in the territorial 
Governments would disappear as a result of federation and were 
not sure of securing seats in the Federal Cabinet. Neither Dr. 
Nyerere nor Mr. Kenyatta was vulnerable to such accusations, for 
the former was an ardent federalist and the latter was certain to be 
offered the top position in the Federal Government. The reluctance 
of Dr. Obote was said by some to be due to his awareness that he 
would be doomed to a distinctly secondary position at the federal 
level since the other two Heads of Government so clearly surpassed 
him in stature. 
These accusations must be discounted at least in part because 
they were so often made by Opposition members seeking to discredit 
the Government by suggesting that Ministers were being guided 
primarily by their own personal interests. Such a purpose was not 
always present, however. Mr. Joseph Murumbi, for example, 
expressed his conviction in October 1963 that the difficulty in 
Uganda arose essentially from the fears of the leadership there. 
" Some of the Uganda leaders feel they might become nonentities 
overnight", he said.47 Two Tanzanian Ministers indicted Kenya's 
" junior leaders " as well in similar terms,48 and Uganda's Director 
of Planning said in June 1965 that he was convinced after examining 
all the possible obstacles to unity that the attitude of the leaders was 
the basic one and that unless they became willing to sacrifice their 
personal ambitions and privileges, federation would never be 
achieved.49 
V 
The problems encountered in the effort to federate East Africa 
were internal not only in the sense that there were genuinely 
indigenous interterritorial conflicts and tensions, but also in that 
difficulties existed within Uganda and Kenya which prevented their 
leaders from proceeding quickly to federation. Differences had to 
be resolved among various groups inside these territories as well as 
4 6 Uganda National Assembly Debates, June 21, 1965, Tape No. 24, p. 3 (Abu Mayanja). 
47 East African Standard, October 25, 1963. 
4 8 United Republic o£ Tanganyika and Zanzibar National Assembly, Official Report, June 
23, 1964, cols. 334-335 (C. G. Kahama); CLA meeting of May 19, 1965, as reported in 
Daily Nation, May 20, 1965 (M. M. Kamaliza). 
49 Uganda Argus, June 17, 1965. 
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between the territories, and the question of federation could not be 
dissociated from the struggle for power domestically. 
Buganda's Attitude 
A major problem which faced Dr. Obote was the attitude of 
Buganda, the most important of the political subdivisions in Uganda. 
A proud and well-organised kingdom ruled by the hereditary 
Kabaka, it enjoyed a semi-autonomous position under the Ugandan 
Constitution, exercising extensive powers which could not be altered 
without its consent. Buganda had traditionally been wary of East 
African Federation for fear that such an arrangement would 
jeopardise its privileged status, and as recently as January 26, 1963, 
its legislature, the Lukiko, had passed a resolution opposing political 
union. 
Five days after the Nairobi Declaration, a closed session of the 
Lukiko was presented by the Kabaka's Cabinet with a statement of 
policy which viewed East African Federation with favour on con-
dition that Buganda be one of its constituent units. This was said 
to be necessary to guarantee the future not only of its monarchy and 
other traditional institutions but also of its very identity. The 
Lukiko authorised the Kabaka's Ministers to open talks with the 
Uganda Government on federation, but declined to take a stand on 
the issue itself until the terms of the constitution became available. 
The Working Party immediately requested an audience with the 
Kabaka and on June 13 was received by him in his palace. Mr. 
Mboya said afterwards that everyone present obviously wanted unity 
and that " there are no big problems to be surmounted ".50 It was 
deemed desirable, nevertheless, to arrange a meeting between the 
three heads of Government and the several hereditary rulers of 
Uganda at the end of the month. Messrs. Kenyatta and Mboya 
arrived in Kampala early enough to join Dr. Obote in addressing 
a public rally on June 29 at which the anti-federalists were criticised 
in such a way as to offend Buganda. The Kabaka did not appear 
at the meeting with the heads of Government two days later, due, 
according to has spokesman, to the fact that at the last minute it had 
been shifted from his palace to the Uganda Parliament Building. 
Dr. Obote's office replied that there had been no change in the 
place but only in the time of meeting and that the Kabaka's secre-
tary had been notified well in advance. This " misunderstanding " 
led reporters to speculate on the possibility that serious difficulties 
S® Ibid. June 14, 1963. 
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had arisen, but Mr. Mboya assured them that there was no signi-
ficance in the Kabaka's failure to attend the talks and no threat to 
the chance of reaching speedy agreement.51 
The Kabaka's Ministers did meet with Dr. Obote at about this 
time, however, to express regret that he had signed the Nairobi 
Declaration without consulting them and to ask what the federal 
constitution would provide. The Prime Minister replied, according 
to a Buganda Government statement, that he had not even consulted 
his own Cabinet before going to Nairobi, that the Declaration did 
not definitely commit Uganda to federation, and that he could not 
say what the constitution would look like until the Working Party 
had completed its draft.52 In an effort to reassure Buganda publicly, 
he told the Ugandan National Assembly that " if this federation is 
to come into being, it would be necessary to come to this House, 
and possibly to go to other legislatures, to amend certain sections 
of our Constitution ".53 
The Uganda Government was completely unwilling to accept 
Buganda's demand that it be allowed to enter the federation as a 
separate constituent unit, and its Minister of Justice rejected the idea 
publicly on August 22, 1963.54 To have accepted that demand 
would have meant the division if not liquidation of Uganda, and 
the Government was not prepared to pay such a price to achieve 
federation. To have pressed towards the establishment of a federal 
government without concession to Buganda on this point would 
have been to risk the downfall of the Obote Government, for it 
rested upon an alliance between the Uganda People's Congress 
(UPC) and the Buganda party known as Kabaka Yekka (KY). 
Such action would also have threatened the very unity of Uganda 
itself. Dr. Obote therefore felt compelled to proceed very cautiously 
indeed. He asked the leaders of Kenya and Tanganyika to give him 
time " to consolidate his political position " when they urged him 
to meet with them in an effort to break the deadlock in the Working 
Party, according to Mr. Kambona55; and he explained to the dele-
gation from the backbenchers' conference, according to one of its 
members, that he could not take Uganda into federation immediately 
because it would be " practically impossible " for him to secure 
51 East African Standard, July 3, 1963. 
52 Uganda Argus, July 3, 1963. For substantiation of the point that Dr. Obote had not 
consulted his Cabinet, see Uganda National Assembly, Official Report, July 10, 1964, 
col. 2430 (B. K. Kirya). 
5 3 Uganda National Assembly, Official Report, July 2, 1963, col. 734. 
51 Uganda Argus, August 23, 1963. 
55 Pan-Africa (Nairobi), May 15, 1964, p. 22. 
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the necessary majorities in the National Assembly and in the 
Lukiko.56 
While the problem of Buganda does seem to have been a major 
factor in shaping the Ugandan position on federation, it must not 
be accepted as the sole explanation. Some have held, in fact, that 
the Government had decided to withdraw from the federal move-
ment for other reasons altogether and was using Buganda as " an 
Tribal Resistance in Kenya 
The domestic political situation also affected to some extent Kenya's 
behaviour regarding federation. That territory advanced to inde-
pendence with a constitution which allocated considerable power to 
the seven regions or majimbo into which it was divided. Such a 
decentralised pattern had been demanded by the Kenya African 
Democratic Union (KADU), for the smaller tribes which supported 
that party saw in it a protection against domination by the larger 
and more advanced tribes. The general election of May 1963 was 
won by KANU, a party based primarily on the Kikuyu and Luo 
tribes which considered this constitution too cumbersome for 
effective government and was eager to reduce materially the status 
of the regions. 
KADU leaders welcomed the Nairobi Declaration, but insisted 
that power must be surrendered to the federation only at the expense 
of the central Government of Kenya; there must be no tampering 
with the authority of the regions. Indeed, they held that the regions 
should be the constituent units in the East African Federation and 
that Kenya as such should be eliminated.58 
KANU was unalterably opposed to this idea; it maintained that 
both the territorial and regional governments must relinquish power 
and that Kenya must enter the federation as a unified—and more 
centralised—whole.59 On June 17, 1964, Mr. Kenyatta told the 
House of Representatives that " if it was not for a KADU nuisance 
we would have federated a long time ago. . . . If it was not for the 
introduction of majimbo by KADU, the Federation would have 
8 6 Kenya House of Representatives, Official Report, June 17, 1964, col. 284 (Z. N . Anyieni). 
5 7 Uganda National Assembly Debates, June 21, 1965, Tape No. 24, p. 3 (Abu Mayanja). 
See also Tape No. 25, p. 4. 
5 8 Kenya House of Representatives, Official Report, June 25, 1963, cols. 310 (M. Muliro), 
324 (J. K. ole Tipis); June 27, 1963, cols. 405-407, 428-429 (R. G. Ngala); August 2, 
1963, col. 1700 (R. G. Ngala); Kenya Senate, Official Report, July 4, 1963, col. 170 
(N. W. Munoko). 
5 9 Kenya House of Representatives, Official Report, June 27, 1963, cols. 413, 416-417 
(T. J. Mboya), 418-420 (J. G. Kiano); August 2, 1963, col. 1671 (T. J. Mboya); Kenya 
Senate, Official Report, July 9, 1963, col. 260 (J. P. Mathenge). 
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been much easier." He asserted categorically that the existing 
constitution would have to be scrapped before federation would be 
possible; " We cannot have a majimbo Federation ", he said.60 
There were those who argued that majimbo was being made the 
scapegoat in the affair, that the need to amend the constitution was 
merely a pretext for delay which was actually due to very different 
reasons. The Leader of the Opposition termed Mr. Kenyatta's 
explanation " a very lame excuse ", and called attention to the fact 
that the account of the Working Party talks released by the United 
Republic had contained no indication whatever that majimbo was 
a snag.61 The KADU view was that the Government was dragging 
its feet on the matter because the Kikuyu were afraid that their 
influence would be much less on the East African level than it was 
within Kenya alone. 
Party Politics as an Adverse Factor 
Another domestic consideration which seems to have obstructed the 
attainment of federation was the concern of some leaders over its 
possibly adverse effect on their position in party politics at home. 
The Opposition in Uganda charged that Dr. Obote and his friends 
were unenthusiastic about federating because they feared that if they 
went away to the federal capital their party might split into warring 
factions with unforeseeable consequences.62 The point was developed 
more broadly—and more authoritatively—by Mr. Grace Ibingira, 
Minister of State in the Uganda Government, when he explained 
the failure of the federal effort as follows: 
. . . The leaders are conditioned in their actions and thinking by develop-
ments in their Party ranks and the ever-present problems inherent in josding 
for position in the Party machine. . . . This detracts the attention of the 
leaders who become constandy engaged in discovering and exploring tricks or 
coups, real or imaginary, in their Party ranks. Both consciously and un-
consciously they turn to be inward-looking. The prospects of federal union 
then become a vast darkness, crowded with uncertainties and potential rivals. 
. . . In apportionment of responsibility . . . I am compelled, sadly but 
inexorably, to conclude that the fault is embedded in the power mechanics of 
the three main Parties—KANU, T A N U , UPC.6 3 
This may well have been a major factor in shaping the attitude of 
the Kenya Government, especially after the admission of extremely 
Leftist elements to the United Republic Cabinet, for Mr. Mboya had 
6 0 Kenya House of Representatives, Official Report, June 17, 1964, cols. 269-271. 
61 Ibid. June 18, 1964, col. 329. 
6 2 Uganda National Assembly, Official Report, July 10, 1964, cols. 2429-2430. 
63 Reporter (Nairobi), July 2, 1965, p. 10; Uganda Argus, June 19, 1965. 
65 
J. H. PROCTOR, JR. 
reason to fear that union with such a Government would serve to 
strengthen the position of his principal antagonist in KANU, Mr. 
Oginga Odinga. 
VI 
As one looks back over what has happened since the Nairobi 
Declaration, one wonders how the three heads of Government could 
possibly have believed then that a federation could be brought into 
being within seven months. The number and complexity of the 
problems involved in the mere drafting of a federal constitution 
were so great that it was quite unrealistic to expect the Working 
Party to present a final report in ten weeks. Moreover, the three 
leaders could hardly have been unaware of the enormous underlying 
obstacles which existed and of how far they actually were from the 
substantial agreement on fundamentals which is the prerequisite of 
successful federal negotiations. 
It is possible that they somehow underestimated the difficulties 
and that unanticipated impediments were encountered after the 
drafting got under way which made it impossible to reach a mark 
that had been set in good faith. Such an interpretation was offered 
by Mr. Ibingira when he told the Ugandan National Assembly in 
June 1965 that at the time of the Nairobi Declaration " there was 
no question of problems being visualised which could not be 
surmounted, everything at that time seemed and appeared to be 
possible . . . , but various factors, known and unknown, hidden or 
exposed, came . . . to frustrate the movement . . .".G4 
A more plausible interpretation is that the leaders—or at least 
some of them—actually had no serious intention to federate by the 
end of 1963, if at all, and that the Nairobi Declaration and the 
motions through which the Working Party went were designed in 
fact to serve primarily some other purpose than to carry the federal 
movement forward. 
Was the Nairobi Declaration a Ruse? 
A strong case can be made for the proposition that the whole 
exercise was largely a ruse designed to hasten Kenya's independence. 
The British were known to be very eager for an East African 
Federation, and they were assured by the three heads of Govern-
ment at Nairobi on June 5, 1963, that it would be established in 
short order if Kenya were granted its freedom first. Their 
Declaration read: 
6 4 Uganda National Assembly Debates, June 29, 1965, Tape No. 9, p. 2. 
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W e must declare most strongly our opposition to rny attempt to delay 
the country's achievement of Independence any longer. . . . W e are closely 
involved in this matter now, since a hold-up in Kenya's advance to Inde-
pendence will hinder the achievement of Federation to which we are com-
mitted. T h e three Governments, having agreed to the establishment of a 
Federation this year, expect the British Government to grant Kenya's 
Independence immediately.65 
The East Africans had good reason to believe that Britain would not 
delay relinquishing sovereignty in Kenya if it were convinced that 
to do so would be to obstruct the realisation of federation. 
Just after the first meeting of the Working Party, Mr. Mboya 
headed a delegation to London to press the Kenyan demands. He 
described the accomplishments of that meeting to Mr. Duncan 
Sandys, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for 
Colonies, and secured from him a commitment to convene a Kenya 
Independence Conference in September and to transfer power 
finally on December 12. When Mr. Sandys informed the House of 
Commons of these arrangements, he said that the decision to 
federate was " an important new development . . . which has to be 
taken into account in the timing of Kenya's independence ". The 
three Governments had affirmed their intention to establish the 
federation before the end of the year and had " already made sub-
stantial progress in working out the constitution ", he added; and it 
was " in the light of these considerations" that such an early date 
had been set.66 
If this was in fact the purpose which the Nairobi Declaration 
was primarily intended to serve, certain rather puzzling aspects of 
the federal movement become more understandable. This would 
explain why it was that what seemed like such an important com-
mitment could have been signed at a brief and hurriedly arranged 
meeting which was not preceded by any significant preliminary 
negotiations on the subject nor—at least in the case of Uganda—by 
Cabinet discussions; it was not really a commitment at all. It would 
also explain the abrupt change in Uganda's position between the 
first and second meetings of the Working Party. That first session 
may well have been regarded by Uganda less as an occasion for 
genuine bargaining than as a means of benefiting Mr. Mboya's 
mission to London by convincing the British that the East Africans 
were in earnest and that the promised deadline would be met. Once 
the date of Kenya's independence had been set, Uganda could put 
6 5 " T h e Federation Declaration of 5th June, 1963 " , Federation in East Africa, ed. Leys 
and Robson, Appendix I, p. 207. 
6 6 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 680, July 2, 1963, col, 201. 
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forward its objections and demands which were so far-reaching as to 
raise serious doubts about the possibility of implementing the 
Nairobi Declaration. It would explain, finally, Mr. Mboya's 
deliberately concealing the difficulties which arose in the Working 
Party and his misleadingly optimistic statements to the Press; the 
show of unity must be maintained as long as possible to avoid 
complications and embarrassment in the preparations for the transfer 
of power. 
Apart from this circumstantial evidence, there is also the testi-
mony of the East African leaders themselves to support such an 
interpretation. After Kenya was safely free, various Ugandan 
Ministers began to express some surprise and irritation that certain 
Tanganyikans and Kenyans should still be pressing them to federate. 
Dr. Obote told the delegation from the backbenchers' conference in 
May 1964, when explaining his unwillingness to take the steps they 
demanded, that " the idea of Federation had been put forward as an 
argument to speed Kenya's i n d e p e n d e n c e " a n d Mr. A. K. 
Sempa, his Finance Minister, said in the CLA that same month: 
" I think it is wrong that hon. Members should keep on quoting 
this June Declaration. . . . The whole thing was to induce the 
British people to set Kenya free ",68 Dr. Obote repeated this version 
after the subsequent passage of pro-federation resolutions by the 
Tanganyikan and Kenyan Parliaments; he could not understand 
why they had done so, he said, since " the first objective of the 
[Nairobi] meeting was to achieve Kenya's independence—regardless 
of what people today were alleging ",69 
One might suspect Uganda of inventing this interpretation in 
order to excuse itself for backing out—on second thoughts—of a 
movement which had actually been sincerely launched, were it not 
for the substantiation provided later by Mr. Kenyatta himself. 
Speaking to a rally at Kisumu on August 2, 1964, he boasted of how 
he had deceived the British in the matter. He had asked Drs. 
Nyerere and Obote to sign the Nairobi Declaration, he said, because 
he understood that independence would be granted more quickly if 
they agreed to federate. The British had asked him whether he was 
confident that a federal government could be created by the end of 
the year, he continued, and after he had replied affirmatively they 
invited a Kenya delegation to London for talks on independence. 
When the British had questioned his sincerity after the federation 
67 Uganda Argus, May 11, 1964. 
6 8 EACSO, Proceedings of the CLA Debates, May 29, 1964, col. 487. 
69 Uganda Argus, June 27, 1964. 
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failed to materialise, he had replied, " That was diplomacy ". He 
then called upon the crowd to applaud Drs. Nyeiere and Obote for 
their co-operation in accelerating Kenya's independence by this 
" master plan ".70 A spokesman for the Prime Minister objected 
that it was a mistranslation to quote him as having said the 
Declaration was a " trick ", as one of the Nairobi newspapers had 
done; the Swahili word he used actually meant " ingenuity ", he 
explained.71 
Among those fooled by this manoeuvre were not only the British, 
but also many East Africans, including quite possibly Dr. Nyerere. 
A State House spokesman in Dar es Salaam asserted after Mr. 
Kenyatta's disclosures at Kisumu that the President had signed the 
Declaration " in all honesty, believing that federation was genuinely 
wanted 
An Unfortunate Episode 
To those who genuinely champion federalism in East Africa, its 
involvement in the " diplomacy of independence " must appear in 
retrospect to have been unfortunate, for this caused the federal 
negotiations to be undertaken prematurely and in such a way as 
virtually to ensure their failure. From the standpoint of Kenyan 
independence, it was desirable for work on a federal constitution 
to be initiated in June 1963 at the ministerial level, abruptly, and 
under pressure of a tight deadline; but from the standpoint of East 
African federation, this was disastrous. Disputes soon arose which 
drove the three Governments far apart, differences hardened, and 
permanent deadlock ensued. This might have been avoided had 
there first been more discussion of the case for federation within the 
three Cabinets and Parliaments, some acceptance of the general 
principle by those bodies, and some informal exploration of the 
problems involved in framing a federal constitution, preferably with 
the aid of experts. To engage in the essentially artificial and futile 
exercise of attempting to draft a federal constitution in the absence 
of a real readiness to federate or even a clear understanding of 
what federation involved, could only do harm to the cause 
of federalism. The confusion and cynicism which have resulted 
from this fiasco do not provide an atmosphere conducive to the 
resuscitation of the federal movement within the foreseeable future. 
,0 East African Standard, August 3, 1964; Daily Nation, August 3, 1964. 
71 Daily Nation, August 5, 1964. 
72 Tanganyika Standard, August 4, 1964. 
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